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-Abstract- 
 
This paper uses experiments to explore electoral accountability in a legislative system 
that favors seniority. Voters face a trade-off  between pork barrel transfers and policy 
representation. Term limits are tested as a mechanism to reduce the cost of  
searching for a legislator who better represents voters on policy, as well as reducing 
the resulting asymmetric distribution of  income. Subjects‟ preferences on abortion 
are used in an innovative means of  capturing incumbents‟ policy choices where 
subject legislators vote to determine whether a donation is allocated to either a pro-
choice or pro-life foundation. 
 
JEL classification codes: C91, C92, D72, D89, P16   
Keywords: voting, legislature, term limits, experiments 
 
 
WORKING PAPER: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION  
                                                 
1 I gratefully acknowledges financial support from the National Science Foundation (027354) and John and Hallie 
Quinn. I thank David J. Cooper and R. Mark Isaac and other members of  the Experimental Social Science Group at 
Florida State (XS/FS) as well as Eric Dodge and other participants at the 2009 Southern Economic Association 
Meetings and Daniel Houser and other participants at the 2010 APEE meetings for their helpful comments. I thank 
Joseph Calhoun, Joab Corey, Lora Holcombe and Katie Showman for their generous help in recruiting. 
2 Florida State University, Department of  Economics, 113 Collegiate Loop, Room 263, PO Box 3062180, Tallahassee, 
FL 32306-2180. cortneyrodet@gmail.com 
2 
 
1 Introduction 
 
 Seniority in Congress creates two potential challenges. First, consider the principal-agent 
relationship between voters and legislators. Seniority advantage transfers power to the agent through 
their enhanced ability to acquire constituent benefits i.e. pork. 3 This conceivably allows incumbents 
to shirk on policy and creates a collective action problem where voters sacrifice representation on 
policy issues by reelecting incumbents because of  the implicit cost of  foregone federal spending 
associated with electing an inexperienced challenger (Dick and Lott 1993; Bernhardt et al. 2004).  
Second, the competition for pork and the frequent reelection of  incumbents redistributes income to 
districts with senior legislators (Friedman and Wittman 1995; McKelvey and Riezman 1992, Muthoo 
and Shepsle 2010). Proponents of  term limits argue that capping seniority will reduce incumbents‟ 
ability to shirk as well as the cost of  electing a challenger thereby improving representation in the 
legislature. Creating more turn over in the legislature will also reduce the redistributive effects of  
pork-barrel legislation (Dick and Lott 1993, Daniel and Lott 1997, Moncrief, Niemi and Powell 
2004). 
 This project uses controlled experiments to determine whether subjects react to these 
incentives in the laboratory and whether they perceive that term limits reduce the implicit cost of  
replacing a senior legislator. The effect of  term limits on income distribution is also of  interest. 
 In the lab subjects are divided into districts and act as legislators and voters. Legislators set 
taxes that fund pork barrel projects, which are awarded according to seniority, and vote on policy. 
Abortion was chosen as the policy issue for its potential to compete with the monetary incentives 
subjects faced. Certainly most people have an opinion on the issue, regardless of  their political 
activity. More importantly,  I hoped to employ what Zajonc (1980) refers to as “hot cognitions” by 
introducing affect into the voters‟ decision process without requiring them to think much about why 
they may or may not identify with a legislator‟s choice. Voters could express their preference or 
suppress it in favor of  collecting the monetary reward. As Zajonc argues, affect is inescapable, but it 
is possible for individuals to control their expression.  
Policy was implemented through the novel use of  donations to pro-life and pro-choice 
foundations, where legislators voted to determine the recipient. Legislators knew the majority 
                                                 
3
 See Plott (1968), Dick and Lott (1993), Friedman and Wittman (1995), Knight (2002), Bernhardt, Dubey and Hughson 
(2004), and Chen and Niou (2005). 
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preference of  the districts, but voters could only infer the legislators‟ preferences through their 
policy votes. Voters determined whether the incumbent was reelected or an unproven challenger 
took office in the upcoming round. The underlying model predicts that voters concerned with 
monetary payoffs reelect incumbents regardless of  policy choices in order to maintain an advantage 
in pork barrel spending. Term limits were imposed with the expectation of  increasing electoral 
accountability by decreasing the cost of  replacing an incumbent. The cap on seniority was also 
predicted to diminish the asymmetric income effects of  pork barrel legislation. 
I find that senior incumbents do not capitalize on their advantage when voting on policy and 
that voters hold incumbents accountable when it is relatively inexpensive to do so. When terms are 
not limited, the reelection rate of  senior incumbents who vote against district majorities (shirk) is 
high but is slightly lower than the reelection rate of  those senior incumbents who vote with the 
district majority. On the other hand, junior incumbents who shirk are reelected at a significantly 
lower rate than both senior incumbents in general and junior incumbents who vote with the district 
majority. An important result of  the paper is that shirking decreases an individual voter‟s likelihood 
of  voting for the incumbent, but reelection rates are unaffected. This highlights the importance of  
the electoral process in aggregating individual decisions. Term limits do significantly affect the 
individual decision to vote for senior incumbents who shirk, but this effect does not manifest itself  
in reelection rates either. Finally, it is likely that term limits do impact the distribution of  income 
resulting from pork barrel legislation. 
 The following section provides a brief  summary of  previous research. Section 3 contains the 
model and describes an equilibrium where senior incumbents are always reelected regardless of  
policy choice when terms are not limited. Introducing term limits into the model improves policy 
representation under certain conditions. Careful attention is devoted to the experimental design in 
section 4 where procedures and hypotheses are explained. Results follow in section 5 and a summary 
concludes. 
     
2 Background 
 
  Structuring a contract that aligns principal and agent interests is challenging. In theory, 
voters can do this by holding recurring elections and rewarding agents with long-term employment; 
however, when tenure becomes an allocation mechanism for political benefits, the principal may be 
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inclined to lower her performance standard. That is, the principal and agent‟s interests are no longer 
aligned and the constitutionally established method of  inducing acceptable effort is no longer 
effective (Barro 1973, Ferejohn 1986). Evidence suggests that shirking increases as the principal-
agent bond between voter and legislator weakens (Kalt and Zuppan 1990).4 
 In the distributive theory of  government, seniority advantage stems from experience, 
committee leadership, and agenda-setting power (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Lopez 2003; Muthoo 
and Shepsle 2010). Alvarez and Saving (1997) find strong evidence that committee membership on 
what they call “prestige” and “constituency” committees significantly increases spending in home 
districts.5 As Calamita (1991) wrote, “…[C]omittee and subcommittee chairmen are often powerful 
enough to single-handedly land their district or state significant amounts of  federal jobs and 
money.”6  
 McKelvey and Riezman (1992) effectively frame seniority as a strategic advantage in 
reelection.7 Seniority provides incumbents with an asset that no challenger can trump (see also 
Muthoo and Shepsle 2010). Models in this vein use the concept of  Markov subgame perfect 
equilibrium to showcase endogenously instituted seniority and zero legislator turnover. Legislative 
bargaining models featuring ideology imply that senior legislators use their advantage to buy votes 
and impose their ideology while never losing reelection (Baron and Ferejohn 1989, McKelvey and 
Riezman 1992, Jackson and Moselle 2002).8 Theoretical and experimental work using spatial models 
with valence advantaged candidates has shown that advantaged incumbents move closer to their 
preferred policy as the advantage increases (Stokes 1963; Feld and Grofman 1991; Wittman 1983; 
                                                 
4 There are several challenges to capturing the phenomenon empirically. First, it is difficult to truly measure electorate 
preferences as well as differentiate the geographic constituency from the electoral constituency whose vote is decisive. 
Deviations from general constituent interests are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for there to be shirking. 
Secondly, the traditional method of  capturing the influence of  an incumbent‟s preferences, or ideology, on their voting 
record with the residual from a first stage ideology regression likely suffers from multicollinearity problems, omitted 
variable bias, and measurement problems (Bender and Lott 1996). This provides justification for the use of  experiments 
where the relevant constituency is identifiable and shirking is measurable as are preferences. 
5 The prestige committees include Appropriations, Budget, Rules and Ways and Means. The constituency committees 
include Agriculture, Armed Services, Interior, Merchant Marine, Public Works, Science, Small Business, and Veterans‟ 
Affairs. 
6 Calamita uses the example of  Senator Robert Byrd who was able to transfer facilities of  the FBI, CIA, Bureau of  
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Bureau of  Public Debt, and IRS from Washington D.C. to West Virginia. 
7
 See also Holcombe (1989). 
8
 This suggests that economic outcomes are incorporated into the voter calculus. See Kramer (1971), Fiorina (1978), Lau 
and Sears (1981), Kiewiet and Rivers (1984), Stein and Bickers (1994), Alvarez and Saving (1997), Levitt and Snyder 
(1997), Gomez and Wilson (2001), and Arceneaux (2006) for empirical confirmation of  this question. Here I argue that 
voters are both retrospective and prospective in vote choice. They are prospective in the sense that they look forward to 
future pork, but are simultaneously retrospective when considering legislators‟ policy choices. 
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Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000; Groseclose 2001; Aragones and Palfrey 2002, 2004, 2005). These 
studies corroborate well with the evidence that winning incumbents are farther away from the 
median voter as a group compared to challengers of  both major parties (Achen 1978). Incumbents 
from non-marginal districts have also been shown to almost always win despite typically being 
farther away from the median than the challenger (Sullivan and Uslaner 1978).  
 Simultaneously high reelection rates and low approval ratings of  Congress as a whole are 
suggestive of  this principal-agent problem and the high cost of  electoral accountability (Erikson and 
Wright 2005, Elhauge, Lott, and Manning 1997).  Reelection rates in the 2010 elections were 87 
percent in the House and 84 percent in the Senate, while Gallup polls show that 75 percent of  
respondents disapprove of  Congress as a whole (Saad 2011). Approving of  one‟s legislator while 
disapproving of  the legislature as a whole is not necessarily a sign of  inconsistency, but these results 
might hint at dissatisfaction with a system that encourages strategic reelection of  incumbents who 
do not represent the electorate on policy.  
 Term limits have been proposed as a solution to lowering the cost of  “voting the bums out.” 
However, the fact that the twenty-three states that unilaterally imposed congressional term limits 
between 1990 and 1995 used trigger clauses calling for a certain number of  states to likewise impose 
limits before implementing them serves as evidence of  the underlying collective action problem. 
The reality that twenty-seven states did not pass term limit amendments is an indication of  the free 
riding involved (Elhauge, Lott and Manning 1997).9  
 Overall, the aim of  this project is to add to this existing literature by using a novel 
experiment that examines electoral accountability and the effectiveness of  term limts in a system 
with seniority advantage in pork barrel legislation.  
 
3 Model 
 
                                                 
9 Empirical analysis of  state legislatures suggests term limits limit incumbents‟ ability to promise service and favors 
leading to less campaign contributions and more competitive elections (Daniel and Lott 1997; Moncrief, Niemi and 
Powell 2004). This correlates well with the finding that incumbents in their final term spend significantly less time and 
effort acquiring district specific benefits and pork (Carey, Niemi and Powell 1998). Besley (2006) finds that governors in 
their final term are significantly more congruent to the electorate, suggesting a selection effect where those governors 
that make it to their last term are only those that perform according to electorate standards. We might infer from this an 
increased willingness of  voters to not reelect a powerful incumbent. For a review of  empirical work involving term limits 
see Besley (2006) and Morton (2006). 
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 The model is constructed as a three period problem describing the incentives encountered 
with and without term limits. Incumbents are assumed to seek reelection while influencing policy 
and enjoying the perquisites of  office. Voters value policy as well as transfers that are dependent on 
the incumbent‟s seniority status. Challengers do not assume an active role within the model, but the 
existence of  an alternative to the status quo is sufficient for our purposes.. Some simplifications are 
made in explaining the model in order to form a concept of  what to test experimentally. 
 Suppose there is an odd number of  districts,  , and each has a legislator,    . The number 
of  voters in a district is represented by   ,           . For simplicity, each district has an equal 
number of  voters. Incumbents are distinguished within the legislature by the measure   , which is 
equal to their tenure in office. This leads to the first critical assumption. 
 
Assumption 1:  The incumbent from each district is determined to be either senior or junior based on 
   . That is, 
     
                 
                
  , 
where    is the median tenure  among all incumbents.
 10  
 
  Voters are assumed to be risk neutral utility maximizers whose single period payoff  is 
based on government transfers and policy choice: 
               –         –          (1) 
The term           indicates the consumption good that is a function of  the incumbent‟s seniority 
status. The term   is the relative weight that the voter places on the policy issue. The enacted policy 
is    and the voter‟s preferred policy is     . 
 
Assumption 2: The policy issue is a binary set. That is          . Preferences are independently and 
identically distributed where the median preference is       and     is the variance. The use of  
Euclidean preferences implies the median voter is decisive. Therefore            describes 
                                                 
10 This assumption precludes the possibility of  voters competing to have a more senior incumbent among the junior set, 
which admittedly may have important implications on the model‟s conclusions. Dick and Lott (1993) elaborate on this 
competition, but do not model it specifically. 
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the number of  district voters on either side of  the policy issue. In a world without transfers a 
candidate who supports (opposes) the policy would be elected if                   . 
 
Assumption 3: The relative weight of  the policy issue,  , is equal across all voters.  
 
 This is a vital assumption that allows us to remain in a single dimension policy space and rely 
on the median voter theorem to locate the pivotal voter in each district. This leads to the following 
lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: All voters share the same   and the median voter on the policy dimension is pivotal. 
 
Proof: This follows simply because α is a multiplicative constant that affects each voter equally. 
 
Assumption 4: Voters  with senior legislators enjoy positive transfers which are financed by voters in 
junior districts.11  That is,                                    .  
 
 Legislators are risk neutral utility maximizers whose single period preferences are based on 
perquisites of  office as well as policy: 
      –        –         (2) 
The term  is the legislator‟s material utility. The term   is the relative weight that the legislator 
places on the policy issue where     is his preferred policy choice. The next simplifying assumption 
determines the source of  electoral challengers. 
  
Assumption 5: There exists a pool of  legislators who are waiting to take office. Legislators who lose 
reelection enter back into this pool and campaign for office elsewhere. Legislators in office earn a 
salary of   and those campaigning earn a salary of   . It is assumed that    to reflect the 
                                                 
11 The experimental design features a tax equal to the full voter endowment. Legislators vote to determine if  voters are 
taxed. This part is in the background of  the model for simplification. The structure of  the tax benefits and seniority 
implies that the tax should always pass. This assumption is inconsistent with the theory of  universalism where logrolling 
involves all legislators and legislation is passed unanimously; however, lack of  empirical support for universalism 
strengthens this assumption (Alvarez and Saving 1997). 
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incentives and material advantages incumbents have over challengers as well as the perquisites of  
holding office. 
 Each period of  the game has two stages.12 In the first stage, legislators vote on policy. In the 
second stage, voters see their legislator‟s choice and vote to determine the incumbent‟s fate. The 
models found in McKelvey and Riezman (1992) and Muthoo and Shepsle (2010) are similar in that 
they contain the element of  seniority but they lack policy choice. Allowing for weakly dominant 
strategies where a pivotal voter in a junior district is indifferent between a junior incumbent and a 
newly “minted” challenger leads to zero legislator turnover. (see Muthoo and Shepsle (2010) for a 
nice exposition of  both models). 
 Adding policy to the model implies that the weight   in the voter utility function is crucial to 
finding an equilibrium where there is no legislator turnover. First I will show that when the pivotal 
voter is less than certain about turnover, there is a range for   in which she chooses a senior 
incumbent regardless of  his policy choice. On the other hand, she will choose the challenger over a 
junior incumbent who votes against her policy preference. I will also show that there exists a range 
of   where the pivotal voter‟s choice depends on the presence of  term limits. When terms are not 
limited she will vote for the senior incumbent regardless of  his policy choice, but when terms are 
limited she will vote for the challenger rather than the shirking senior incumbent.  
 The voter strategy space   includes two strategies: I = always vote for the incumbent and A 
= vote for the incumbent if  he agrees on policy. The state of  the world is determined by the 
seniority of  the incumbent and the enforcement of  term limits. Table 1 lists the pivotal voter‟s 
payoffs beginning from period one of  the three period game when the incumbent votes against her 
policy preference in the first period. Each case is a particular state of  the world. It is a dominant 
strategy for a voter to reelect an incumbent who votes for her preferred policy, thus in the table it is 
assumed the incumbent votes against the voter‟s preference in period one.13 An elected challenger is 
                                                 
12 The experiment includes another dimension to the legislators‟ role where the first stage involves legislators voting 
whether or not to tax voters to provide transfers to those in senior districts. This part is bypassed here for exposition 
purposes. 
13 To see why this is sensible suppose that the legislator holds the minority preference and determines that in the first 
period he can maximize his period payoff  by voting against the district majority. If  he is reelected, he has no reason to 
then vote with the majority in the periods thereafter. However, it is necessary to justify ignoring the possibility that the 
incumbent votes with the district majority in the first period, but changes his vote in later periods. A legislator that votes 
with the majority might suspect he can get away with voting against the majority after being reelected in the first period, 
but this does not change the voter‟s choice of  strategy because any strategy that maximizes utility conditional on α in the 
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assumed to have the same policy preference as the district majority. It is also assumed that he enters 
office as a junior legislator. This means that the voter does not receive a transfer in the first term 
with a newly elected legislator. The voter holds belief      that the newly elected challenger will 
become senior after his first term if  reelected. In cases 3 and 4 term limits are imposed in the third 
period meaning that voters can keep the incumbent for periods one and two but are forced to elect a 
newly “minted” legislator without seniority in the third period. 
 
Table 1: Voter strategies and Payoffs 
Case 1: No Term Limits 
Incumbent in period 1 is senior and votes against the policy preference 
Strategy Payoff  over three periods 
I                 –     
A              
Case 2: No Term Limits 
Incumbent in period 1 is junior and votes against the policy preference 
Strategy Payoff  over three periods 
I                    –     
A              
Case 3: Term Limits 
Incumbent in period 1 is senior and votes against policy preference 
Strategy Payoff  over three periods 
I            –     
A              
Case 4: Term Limits 
Incumbent in period 1 is junior and votes against policy preference 
Strategy Payoff 
I               –     
A              
 
                                                                                                                                                             
three period case above would be optimal in a condensed version beginning in the period that the incumbent changed 
his vote. 
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  Notice that imposing term limits simply reduces the payoff  from using strategy I 
because she cannot elect the incumbent in the third period when the term limit is imposed. We will 
now find the conditions required on   to determine what strategy will be chosen in each case. 
 The pivotal voter plays strategy I if  and only if  Condition 1(C1) holds: 
      
    
      
         (3) 
 Similarly, for Case 2 the pivotal voter uses strategy I if  and only if  Condition 2 (C2) holds: 
  
 
      
       (4) 
 Comparing C1 to C2 shows that as long as      , C2 is more restrictive; otherwise they are 
equal. This leads to the first result. 
 
Result 1: As long as voters are less than certain       that changes in seniority are likely to occur, there exists a 
range of    where the pivotal voter will prefer a senior incumbent regardless of  policy choice when terms are not limited, 
but will choose the challenger over a junior incumbent who shirks.  
 
 Figure 1 shows   as a real valued number bounded below by zero. If    is below C2, the 
voter prefers a senior incumbent regardless of  his policy choice. If  it lies above C1 then she always 
prefers a challenger over a senior incumbent who votes against her policy preference. Above C2 the 
voter prefers to elect the challenger if  the current incumbent is junior and shirks. Consequently, if    
is between C2 and C1 the voter will re-elect any senior incumbent, but will only elect junior 
incumbents who vote for her preferred policy. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Range of  α showing Conditions 1 and 2 
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Now we can compare the conditions on   under term limits beginning with Case 3. The pivotal 
voter chooses I over A if  and only if  Condition 3 (C3) holds: 
               (5) 
 For Case 4 it can be shown that the voter chooses I and A if  and only if  Condition 4 (C4) 
holds: 
               (6) 
 A comparison of  C3 and C4 shows that the latter is more restrictive, which implies that as 
long as       then there are voters who will keep a senior incumbent who shirks but not a junior 
one when terms are limited.  
 
Result 2: As long as voters are less than certain       that changes in seniority are likely to occur, there exists a 
range of    where a voter will prefer to hold onto a senior incumbent regardless of  policy choice when terms are limited, 
but will choose the challenger over a junior incumbent who shirks.  
  
The next result is the motivation of  this paper. Comparing C1 to C3 shows that the latter is more 
restrictive. Of  course, these conditions apply under two different sets of election rules. But the 
importance of  this result is that it allows for the possibility of  an equilibrium where electoral 
accountability is dependent on the presence of  term limits. 
 
Result 3: There exists a range of    where a voter will prefer to hold onto a senior incumbent regardless of  policy 
choice when terms are not limited, but will choose the challenger over a senior incumbent shirks when terms are limited. 
  
  
 
Figure 2: Range of  α showing Conditions 1, 2 and 4 
 
 
Figure 2 shows that   in the range above C1 means that voters will not reelect any incumbent who 
shirks on policy. If    is between C1 and C2, voters allow senior incumbents to shirk when terms are 
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not limited. An   in the range between C1 and C4 implies that voters will allow senior incumbents 
to shirk when terms are not limited but will choose the challenger over a shirking senior incumbent 
if  term limits cap seniority.14 
 
Proposition 1: Assuming symmetry across all districts, if    is in the range             
 + 21+ + 2   there exists multiple equilibria without legislator turnover among senior 
incumbents when terms are not limited. Senior legislators can shirk and win reelection, but junior 
legislators are only reelected if  they vote with the district majority. This case is referred to as a 
“shirking equilibrium”. Considering the same range of  , when terms are limited shirking legislators 
are never reelected and legislator turnover is high in equilibrium. This is referred to as the “high-
turnover equilibrium”. 
  
 Incumbents in the shirking equilibrium do not have an incentive to deviate from voting for 
their own preferred policy unless they are junior. Legislators will always vote for their preferred 
policy given a sufficiently large β when terms are limited even if  they are junior, but more voters are 
willing to elect a challenger because of  the reduced cost in terms of foregone transfers. The latter 
may seem like a grim outcome, but the fact that voters are not willing to put up with a shirking 
legislator means representation should improve overall. 
 Until now    has been assumed to be positive but less than one and any implications from a 
change in election rules have been ignored. However, the election rules are vital to a voter‟s belief  
about change in seniority in any period. Allowing a voter‟s belief  to vary based on the election 
institution is important. 
 To give an example of  what these equilibria might be like, suppose that when terms are not 
limited voters have little confidence that a change in seniority will take place i.e.      . This 
expands the range between C1 and C2 such that the former is now equal to   (the tax transfer 
voters in senior districts receive) and C2 is zero. A voter will prefer a challenger to a shirking senior 
                                                 
14 Although the relationships between C2 and C1 and C4 and C1 in Figure 2 always hold, it is not the case that C4 is 
always greater than C2. In fact this is a very important result because for sufficiently large        
      
         
   C4 is 
less than C2. This would indicate a range (between C4 and C2) where voters tolerate shirking by either junior or senior 
incumbents when terms are not limited, but who do not tolerate any shirking when terms are limited. 
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incumbent only if  she places an extremely large weight on policy in her utility function. Because 
legislators are first movers and anticipate voter reaction, the dominant strategy for them is to vote 
for their preferred policy even when it is against the district majority. 
  Now suppose term limits are imposed and the belief  that seniority in the legislature will 
change increases to one. The new point for C4 is         such that if    is above this point she 
now prefers not to reelect a shirking incumbent even if  he is senior. Below this point a voter will re-
elect a senior incumbent who shirks, but not a junior one. Of  course if        , the range 
between C4 and   gets larger. This implies there is a greater likelihood that voters choose to re-elect 
a shirking senior incumbent when terms are not limited but vote to elect the challenger under term 
limits.  
 
Corollary 1: There is asymmetric distribution of  income from junior districts to senior ones in a 
shirking equilibrium. Voters from junior districts finance the transfers and senior incumbents never 
lose reelection. Term limits reduce the asymmetric redistribution by forcing incumbents out of  
office and reducing the cost of  electing a challenger.  
 
 The model, while stylized, contains the correct incentives consistent with the research 
question and provides an outline of  the results to be tested experimentally. The next section lays out 
the design and procedures. 
 
4 Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
4.1 Design 
This section introduces the experimental design. Attention will be given to its implementation as 
well as the non-standard method of  recruiting subjects. The general set up included     districts 
with      voters per district. The number of  legislators was set to    . Only three are in office 
14 
 
at one time and are referred to as being “active.” The other three are considered “inactive.” This 
means          subjects total per session.
15 
Each session had three phases. The first phase lasted five periods and was the control treatment. 
Legislators only made decisions regarding taxes in this round. The second phase, Treatment 1, lasted 
ten periods.  Here legislators made policy and tax decisions. Treatment 2 was the final phase and 
lasted ten periods. In this treatment a two period term limit was placed on the number of  
consecutive periods a legislator could be active. The order of  the second and third phase was varied 
to account for order effects. 
Subjects were regrouped into new districts with randomly chosen legislators at the beginning of  
each phase; however, the group of  legislators remained fixed across all phases. Voters received an 
endowment of  fifty cents each period subject to taxation to fund pork.16 Active legislators received a 
salary of  sixty cents each period while in office. Inactive legislators did not receive a salary but could 
earn money decoding text strings for 2.5 cents for every correct code. This was done to create some 
incentive for legislators to stay in office as well as to keep inactive legislators engaged throughout the 
experiment. Payoffs were summed across all periods. 
 Voter payoffs were a function of  the endowment, the tax and the legislator‟s seniority, 
         
 
  
       (7) 
 where   is the endowment,   is the tax rate, and   measures the legislator's relative share of  pork, 
 , which is the sum of  taxes collected across all voters. A voter‟s share was based on her legislator‟s 
seniority, thus   is a fixed proportion. The vector   lists the relative shares of  the first, second and 
third ranked legislators based on tenure:                . Taxes were homogenous such that 
        . Thus, voters in a senior district received seventy-five cents whereas the others 
received nothing if  the tax passed.17  
 A linear payoff  function was implemented to sharpen incentives such that districts either 
desired a full tax or none at all. Junior voters want to avoid a tax because it meant financing pork for 
other districts. Thus the tax was a purely redistributive one. The structure of  the shares implies that 
                                                 
15 The original design used five districts of  three voters each and ten legislators for a total of  twenty-five subjects per 
session. The first three sessions used this design, but due to recruiting challenges, I decided to use the design described 
above. 
16 The voters in sessions with five districts received an endowment of  45 cents, but shares of  pork for voters in senior 
districts stayed the same. 
17 In the larger sessions the top three districts had a seniority advantage. 
15 
 
a majority of  the active legislators always wanted to tax voters. Any other setup would allow for a 
majority to prefer not to pass pork legislation or call for allowing legislative bargaining. Fixing the 
shares accordingly such that there is always an advantaged majority is also consistent with legislative 
bargaining literature where a minimum winning coalition decides how to split the pie (Baron and 
Ferejohn 1989; Frechette, Kagel and Lehrer 2003; Frechette, Kagel and Morelli 2009).  
To begin each phase active legislators were randomly determined to be either “senior” or 
“junior”. Seniority status was then dependent on the number of  consecutive periods as an active 
legislator. There were an equal number of  pro-choice and pro-life legislators in each experiment to 
allow control over district makeup. Districts always began with an active legislator that opposed the 
district majority in order to maximize the chance for observing shirking. 
 
4.2 Survey 
 The goal was to create the possibility of  shirking. This required a disparity between legislator 
and voter policy preferences. Subjects completed a short survey prior to the experiment to enable 
this. Recruiting from a small subset of  the subject pool made filling a session a challenge, which led 
to a design change where the first three sessions featured five districts instead of  three. The 
appendix includes the survey. 
 Subjects were given summaries of  two foundations related to abortion and asked how well 
they identified with either foundation relative to a seven point Likert scale. The foundations used 
were the Pro-Life Action League and Pro-Choice America. 18  The response scale ranged from 
“Strongly Do Not Identify” to “Strongly Identify.” The language in the survey was taken directly 
from the groups‟ websites. They were selected based on the fact they appeared first in the list of  
search engine results. This was an attempt at being unbiased in selecting the groups. Similar 
questions on other topics and foundations were included so it was not obvious which topic would 
be involved in the upcoming experiment. Subjects provided names and email addresses so they 
could be contacted for the actual experiment. 
 There was a much greater response from self-identified “pro-choice” individuals (fifty-three 
percent) as well as students whose preferences were indiscernible or were explicitly neutral (twenty-
three percent). This unbalanced survey sample led to five of  the eight total sessions using self-
                                                 
18 The Pro-Life Action League is a non-violent protest group and Pro-Choice America is a lobbying organization. 
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identified pro-choice subjects as voters. Of  course, this was not the initial intent. Specific numbers 
of  subjects from each self-identified group were recruited for each session. For instance, when the 
session featured three districts using pro-choice voters, twelve pro-choice subjects were recruited 
where nine filled the role of  voter and three filled the role of  legislator. Their roles were determined 
randomly upon arrival to the laboratory. Three pro-life subjects were recruited to fulfill the role of  
legislator with opposing preferences. While it was known that these subjects were to act as 
legislators, the group to which they were assigned was always random as was their beginning 
seniority rank. Sessions with pro-life voters likewise had twelve pro-life subjects and three pro-
choice subjects.19 
 Much care was taken to prevent the ill-will of  any subjects because of  the divisive policy 
issue. Subjects were asked before entering the experiment whether they would prefer not to 
participate in an experiment that involved the issues from the survey, to which none of  them 
objected. Within the experiment specific language from the consent form emphasizing the subjects‟ 
right to leave with their earnings at any moment was included in the first paragraph of  the 
instructions. Finally, subjects voluntarily completed a post experiment opinion-poll with an open 
ended question about the experiment‟s content. This was to allow subjects the opportunity to 
express disapproval. No subject ever asked to leave or expressed reproach in the survey. 
 
4.3 Experiment Procedures and Hypotheses 
 The experiment used generic terms where voters were referred to as “Type A players” and 
legislators were called “Type B players”. Districts were rematched and assigned legislators with 
opposing policy preferences in the beginning of  each treatment. The subjects were simply told that 
half  of  the legislators would begin “active” and half  would begin “inactive”. The actual instructions 
can be found in the appendix. Each period of  the game included two stages. The following details 
the different treatments. 
 4.3.1 Control. In Stage 1 of  the Control treatment legislators voted whether to tax the 
electorate or not. If  the tax passed, each voter‟s entire endowment was allocated to a public account 
that was divided according to the explanation above. The shares were divided evenly among voters 
within the districts receiving a positive transfer. If  the tax did not pass, the subjects kept their 
                                                 
19 Sessions with five districts used twenty subjects of  one group where twelve were voters and five were legislators. Five 
subjects from the opposing group were used as legislators for a total of  twenty-five subjects. 
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endowments and no pork was provided. This was a major simplification but it made the incumbents‟ 
decisions more salient to voters. It also allowed voters to understand that the asymmetric nature of  
the transfer 
 In Stage 2 an election was held in each district where voters were asked whether they wanted 
to reelect the incumbent. They were aware of  the allocation mechanism based on seniority as well as 
the relative seniority of  all legislators. They were also aware of  their incumbent‟s choice as well as 
their payoff. The incumbent stayed in office if  a majority of  the district‟s voters approved and the 
experiment advanced to the next period proceeding in the same manner. If  the incumbent failed to 
be reelected, he became inactive and was replaced by a randomly selected inactive legislator. This 
mimicked the idea that a challenger‟s true preferences are not known to voters and can only be 
revealed over time (Chen and Niou 2005). This leads to the first set of  hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1.c: The tax will always pass in the legislature given the artificial minimum winning 
majority. 
Hypothesis 2.c: Voters will always re-elect the incumbent given seniority advantage in pork barrel 
legislation. Seniority rank is non-decreasing if  an incumbent always returns to office. Replacing him 
ensures a smaller share of  pork except for voters in junior district when all districts simultaneously 
replace incumbents. Thus no incumbent will lose an election. 
Hypothesis 3.c: At the end of  the control treatment the voter payoff  distribution will favor the 
districts that begin with seniority. Because the tax will always pass and there is no legislator turnover, 
endowments will be completely redistributed to voters in senior districts. 
 
 4.3.2 Treatment 1: Policy Choice – No Term Limits. In Stage 1 of  Treatment 1, taxes 
and shares of  pork were decided in the same manner as in the control treatment, but the legislators 
also voted on policy. They voted each period to determine which foundation would receive a 
donation of  $2.00. These donations were separate from subject earnings and were aggregated for 
the entire session. This created a non-monetary aspect to the legislators‟ choice set that voters may 
or may not approve of. In reference to the model in Section 3, this relates to the voters‟   term, or 
the relative weight they place on policy representation. Observing voter behavior will provide 
inference regarding the importance of  the policy issue in deciding how to vote. Legislators and 
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voters were informed about the preference of  the district‟s majority. The intensity of  preferences 
was recorded in the survey for ex-post analysis but was not disclosed to the legislators. 
 Stage 2 was the same here as other treatments, but voters also saw the incumbent‟s policy 
vote and which foundation received the donation. 
 
Hypothesis 1.1: The tax always passes. Senior incumbents will vote for their preferred foundation. 
Junior incumbents will vote with the district‟s majority. 
Hypothesis 2.1: Voters will always re-elect senior incumbents given the allocation mechanism 
regardless of  their policy vote. Junior incumbents will be reelected only if  they vote with the district 
majority.  
Hypothesis 3.1: At the end of  Treatment 1, the voter payoff  distribution will favor those districts that 
begin with seniority. 
 
 4.3.3 Treatment 2: Policy Choice - Term Limits. Stages 1 and 2 proceeded the same way 
as in Treatment 1 with the addition of  two-period term limits that capped legislative tenure. Term 
limits were staggered such that the senior legislators were removed from office after two periods if  
not already replaced by voters whereas the junior legislators did not face the term limit until the third 
period if  not already replaced by voters. This was done to vary the timing of  incumbents leaving 
office so junior legislators had a chance to become senior. It was possible a priori that voters 
rendered this ineffective, but there was never a case where every legislator was term limited in the 
same period.  
 
Hypothesis 1.2: The tax always passes and legislators vote for their preferred foundation. 
Hypothesis 2.2: Term limits reduce the cost of  replacing shirking incumbents, thus senior and junior 
incumbents who vote against the majority will be replaced. Policy representation improves as 
districts' willingness to search for a legislator with matching preferences increases. 
Hypothesis 3.2: Term limits reduce the possible seniority advantage and thus lead to a more egalitarian 
distribution of  payoffs across all districts.  
 
5 Results 
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 A total of  eight sessions were run at the XSFS laboratory on the Florida State University 
campus. The average payment was roughly $20 for one hour in the lab. The first three of  these 
sessions used the setup of  twenty-five subjects and five districts and the final five used the fifteen 
subject-three district setup. Three sessions used self-identified pro-choice voters whereas the rest 
used pro-life voters. The order of  treatments was reversed for three of  the sessions as well. Analysis 
controls for these factors where possible. 20   Subjects appear to have understood the seniority 
structure and respond to the incentives it creates; however, term limits prove to be a weak 
mechanism for improving representation.  
 
5.1 Passing the Tax 
 The tax passed eighty-one percent of  the time (n=300 s.d. = 0.40) in the control treatment, 
which is a surprisingly low result. This is not particular to the control as seen in Figure 3. The fact 
that the senior legislators gave up monetary benefits for their voters is odd. Subjects were aware that 
their role as voter or legislator would be the same throughout the experiment, which rules out the 
possibility of  subjects wanting to set a precedent of  low tax passage rates in the case they became a 
voter at some point in the future. One possibility is that incentives were made so sharp that some 
legislators avoided repeatedly leaving other subjects with a period payoff  of  zero because of  other-
regarding preferences. The tax passed at even lower rates in Treatment 1. It passed merely sixty-five 
percent of  the time (n=600 s.d. = 0.48) overall. It passed seventy-one percent of  the time (n=600 
s.d. = 0.45) overall in Treatment 2. It seems especially odd that the tax did not always pass after the 
policy issue was introduced because this provided legislators the opportunity to buy votes and vote 
for their preferred policy. Moreover, if  a legislator wanted to serve the interest of  voters on the 
policy issue, one would assume they would also serve their financial interests. 
 Perhaps legislators wanted to prevent other subjects from making more money than they did 
in the experiment, but this seems highly unlikely because a legislator relied on reelection to maintain 
his or her high payoff  from period to period. Legislators with conflicting preferences might have 
tried to spite voters by not passing the tax, but this would have shown up in the policy vote as well. 
 
                                                 
20 In the fifth session there was a shortage of  two pro-choice subjects, so I elected to use two pro-life subjects as voters. 
This was the only incidence where session composition was not as I explained above. In Treatment 1 these two subjects 
were randomly grouped together, so this group has been dropped from all analysis.  
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Figure 3: Passage Rate of  Tax by Treatment 
  
 
 The distribution scheme of  this game has an ultimatum game flavor, so it is possible that 
legislators exhibited fairness concerns for subjects who had no control over their future payoffs. 
This is contrary to the strategic play in the ultimatum game where it is the responders‟ other-
regarding preferences that matter, as suggested by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Subjects frequently 
give positive amounts in dictator games, but it is well below the amount given in ultimatum games. 
Likewise, Guth and van Damme (1998) show that the dummy player in a three-player ultimatum 
game that has no role in accepting the suggested split by the proposer only receives marginal 
amounts from the agreed upon distribution casting doubt on pure equity concerns. 
 Given the binary nature of  the legislators‟ decisions, a simple adaptation of  the Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) ERC model can be used to estimate the proportion of  legislators who have equity 
preferences and compare it to their results across different types of  games. I ignore the junior 
incumbents because there is no story of  equity concerns to explain junior incumbents voting for the 
tax. I call   the proportion of  subjects with a preference for equal payoffs, or relativists (equivalent 
to   in Bolton and Ockenfel‟s original paper). The payoff  of  active legislators is not dependent on 
their seniority status, so equity concerns would involve the differences in voter payoffs. An egoist 
will vote for the tax        so that their voters receive seventy-five cents and voters from junior 
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districts receive zero, and a relativist will vote against the tax       so that all voters receive fifty 
cents. This means that the proportion of  votes for the tax is                       . 
Thus,     –   .  Using the overall proportion of  senior legislators voting for the tax in all 
treatments,   is estimated to be 0.25. When broken down by treatment, the respective estimates are 
0.22, 0.28 and 0.24 for the control, Treatment1 and Treatment 2. These figures are below the 
estimate of  0.50 Bolton and Ockenfels estimate for the dictator game, such that it is quite possible 
that other-regarding preferences of  relativists led to this outcome.  
 
Experiment Result 1 (Hypotheses 1.c, 1.1 and 1.2): Legislators do not always pass the tax, possibly because of  
other-regarding preferences for voters in junior districts. 
 
5.2 Voting Against the District Majority 
 This section focuses on the legislators who opposed district voters on policy. These 
legislators did not always vote against the majority in Treatment 1. Only thirty-two percent (n = 287 
s.e. = 0.03)21 of  policy votes by these legislators went against the district majority. Figure 4 displays 
shirking according to seniority and treatment and shows that in Treatment 1 senior legislators were 
significantly more likely than junior legislators to vote against the district majority. Senior 
incumbents shirked forty-two percent of  the time compared to the ten percent of  votes by the 
junior incumbents (tstat 6.03 pvalue 0.00). This result is consistent with the predictions; however, it 
is far from the point predictions of  100 and 0 percent. The difference in Treatment 2 is not 
statistically greater than zero (tstat 1.14 pvalue 0.12), which is also consistent with predictions but 
the rates are lower than the point predictions of  100 percent. 
 Three results merit notice. Game theory suggests by backward induction that imposing a 
finite limit causes an unraveling. The results show that senior incumbents were less likely to vote 
against district majorities under term limits than when terms were not limited (34% versus 42%; 
tstat 1.67 pvalue 0.05). Likewise, term limited incumbents were no more likely to shirk in their last 
term than in their first term (33% versus 30% respectively; tstat 0.53 pvalue 0.30). Finally, junior 
                                                 
21 In one session a subject who had been registered by the experimenter as a pro-choice subject was actually pro-life. 
This was discovered after the fact when verifying subject preferences. The instances where this subject was an active 
legislator have been dropped from the analysis. 
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incumbents were more likely to vote against the district majority when terms were limited than when 
they were not. (27% versus 10%; tstat 3.26 pvalue 0.00), which is consistent with model predictions. 
 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of  Legislators Voting Against District Majority by Treatment and Seniority 
 
 
 Voting against district majorities occurred much less frequently than predicted in both 
treatments. The payoff  difference for active and inactive legislators may have been so large that 
active legislators did not want to risk losing reelection. This makes sense in Treatment 1 if  subjects 
believed their chance of  becoming active again was extremely low if  they lost reelection, but the 
small pool of  legislators meant that chances of  becoming active again were high in Treatment 2. In 
Treatment 2 an incumbent who lost reelection had an ex ante probability between forty and sixty 
percent of  becoming active again after one period depending on how many incumbents were forced 
out of  office by term limits. This is an upper bound because actual reelection outcomes may have 
disrupted how term limits were initially staggered. The data show that the ex-post probability was a 
twenty percent chance of  returning after one period and a forty percent chance of  returning after 
two periods. An incumbent remained inactive after losing reelection for 4.32 periods (out of  10) on 
average in Treatment 1. In Treatment 2 a losing or term limited incumbent remained inactive 3.25 
periods on average before becoming active again. The difference is significant (tstat 2.73 pvalue 
0.01). The fact that senior incumbents in Treatment 2 shirked less frequently suggests subjects did 
not understand the impact that term limits had on the likelihood of  returning to office.  
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 Although this was not explicitly tested or modeled, these results would be consistent with the 
classic articles on electoral control by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) that show voters can expect 
better performance from their representatives the higher the relative value of  staying in office. 
Anecdotal evidence from the post-experiment surveys suggests that some subjects perceived that the 
legislators faced the difficult decision of  choosing monetary benefits or their preferred policy. One 
subject wrote that, “it was interesting to see how money affects people‟s choices. [Legislators] had to 
decide between money and what they believe in.”  
 
Experiment Result 2 (Hypotheses 2.c, 2.1 and 2.2): Shirking was less frequent than predicted overall. Senior 
incumbents shirked more frequently than junior incumbents when terms were not limited. Junior incumbents shirked 
more frequently when terms were limited than when they were not. Senior incumbents were no more likely to shirk in 
their last term when terms were limited. 
 
5.3 Reelection 
  
 
 
Figure 5: Reelection Rates by Treatment and Seniority 
 
 
 The effects that shirking and term limits had on reelection rates will now be analyzed. Senior 
incumbents were clearly favored in reelection when considering overall reelection rates as shown in 
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Figure 5. More important are the reelection rates of  those legislators who were in office in the first 
period because they supported the opposite side of  the issue than the voters. Table 2 shows that by 
the fifth and final period of  the control treatment, only 20 out of  30 (67%) original legislators were 
still in office; however, 11 of  the 19 original senior legislators (58%) were still in office. In Treatment 
1, sixteen of  the 29 (55%) original legislators were still in office after the last period. Ten of  the 
original 18 (56%) senior legislators were still in office.  
 These results suggest that subjects understood the implications of  seniority but do not 
match the predictions. More importantly, the differences are much more pronounced when 
conditioned on the incumbent voting against the district majority as shown in Figure 5. Senior 
incumbents who voted against the majority were reelected ninety-one percent of  the time compared 
to thirty-six percent of  the junior incumbents in Treatment 1 (tstat 5.38 pvalue 0.00). Likewise, 
senior incumbents who shirked in Treatment 2 were much more likely to be reelected than junior 
ones (tstat 4.92 pvalue 0.00). Voters were clearly responsive to the seniority structure when it came 
to choosing between pork and policy representation. 
 Perhaps the most important result is that senior incumbents who shirked were reelected 
eighty-eight percent of  the time under term limits compared to ninety-one percent of  the time in 
the no-term-limit treatment. Therefore it appears that voters were not significantly more inclined to 
respond to shirking by electing a challenger when terms were limited (tstat 0.54 pvalue 0.59). 
  
 
 
Figure 6: Reelection Rates of  Shirking Incumbents by Treatment and Seniority 
91%
36%
88%
31%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Senior T1 Junior T1 Senior T2 Junior T2
25 
 
 
Table 2: Reelection of  Original Legislators 
 
 Control* Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Overall number to 
begin 
30 29 29 
Overall number still 
in office at end of  
last period 
20 16 - 
Percentage 67% 55% - 
Number of  senior to 
begin 
19 18 18 
Number of  senior 
still in office at end 
of  last period 
11 10 
All forced out by 
term limit in 
second period 
Percentage 58% 56% - 
The control contained five periods whereas the other treatments contained ten. 
 
  
 It was a concern a priori whether subjects would care about policy in this setting. Abortion 
was selected because it was believed that the average person takes a firm stance on the issue, but the 
observed reaction might have been a function of  donation size. The donation was roughly three to 
four times larger than each voter could have made each period so this argument appears weak. 
Regression analysis controls for subjects‟ strength of  preference and indicates that a stronger 
preference meant lower tolerance for shirking; however, the biggest indicator that policy mattered is 
the low reelection rates of  junior incumbents who vote against the district majority. This implies that 
when the cost of  was accountability was low, voters reacted more frequently. Figure 7 confirms this 
by showing the reelection rates in both treatments by vote and by seniority.   
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  Panel A: Treatment 1     Panel B: Treatment 2 
Figure 7: Reelection Rates of  Incumbents Voting Against and With District Majorities 
 
 
 The reelection rates of  senior incumbents who vote against the district majority are in fact 
lower than those who do not shirk in both treatments, but the rate is still very high (tstat 2.21 pvalue 
0.01 for Treatment 1; tstat 1.92 pvalue 0.03 for Treatment 2). The difference is much more dramatic 
for junior incumbents. In Treatment 1 junior incumbents were reelected seventy-two percent of  the 
time when voting with the district compared to thirty-six percent after having shirked (tstat 2.40 
pvalue 0.01). The difference was even more pronounced in Treatment 2 at seventy-one and thirty-
one percent respectively (tstat 3.92 pvalue 0.00). 
 This leads to another important consideration: the small size of  the voting districts in the 
experiment. Pork may weigh more heavily on the voters‟ decisions because of  the high probability 
of  being pivotal. Caplan (2007) models voter preferences over beliefs and suggests that the price of  
holding certain beliefs is very low given the zero probability of  being pivotal. In this case, the cost 
of  acting on certain beliefs is high because the probability of  being pivotal is high.  
 
Experiment Result 3 (Hypotheses 2.c, 2.1 and 2.2): Voters respond to shirking, but more so when the incumbent is 
junior and the cost of  not reelecting the incumbent is low. Senior incumbents who shirk are reelected at the same rate 
whether terms are limited or not, suggesting voters do not recognize the reduced cost of  electing a challenger when 
seniority advantage is capped. 
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Panel A: Senior and Junior Incumbents Combined 
 
Panel B: Senior Incumbents 
 
Figure 8: Match Rates of  Incumbent and Voter Preferences 
 
 
 A subtle measure of  representation is the proportion of  districts where the voter and 
legislator preferences match. There is an obvious departure from the model in the experimental 
design because a random inactive legislator replaces an incumbent upon losing reelection, but it is 
worthwhile to note that the match rate is significantly higher in Treatment 2 under term limits than 
under Treatment 1 even when voters are not directly choosing the replacement (44% versus 33%; 
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tstat 2.51 pvalue 0.01). Figure 8 shows the proportion of  voters each period with a senior incumbent 
who has matching preferences. It is clear that under term limits voters are more likely to enjoy the 
advantages of  seniority and a legislator with matching preferences (31% versus 14%; tstat 3.22 
pvalue 0.00). There might be reason to suggest that even though term limits do not induce voters to 
replace incumbents who vote against district majorities, they improve representation by force; 
however this is dependent on the underlying distribution of  legislators‟ preferences. 
 
1.5.4 Voter Payoff  Distribution 
  The payoff  distribution in the control treatment clearly favored the districts that began with 
seniority, but there was not complete redistribution to those voters as predicted. This is partially 
attributable to a few senior legislators losing reelection, but it is largely due to the tax not passing 
every period. Figure 9 displays the proportions going to those districts that began with senior 
legislators and those that began with junior legislators for each treatment. 
 The distribution is still skewed in Treatment 1 but less so. This is a product of  some of  the 
original senior legislators losing elections after shirking and the fact that Treatment 1 contained twice 
as many periods, but it is mostly due the tax passing significantly less often than in the control 
treatment (65% versus 81%; tstat 5.00 pvalue 0.00). 
 The payoff  distribution under term limits is much more equal than compared to the control, 
but it isn‟t significantly different from Treatment 1. However, two things should set these treatments 
apart. First, the tax was passed significantly more often in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1 (72% 
versus 65%; tstat 2.61 pvalue 0.01). Second, the general reelection rate was much greater in 
Treatment 1 than Treatment 2 (85% versus 75%; tstat 2.69 pvalue 0.00). Combined, these factors 
likely mean that it was term limits that caused a more egalitarian distribution in Treatment 2. 
 
Experiment Result 4 (Hypotheses 3.c, 3.1 and 3.2): Payoff  distributions favor voters that begin with seniority in all 
treatments. It appears that term limits reduced this asymmetry in Treatment 2. 
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Figure 9: Distribution of  Voter Payoffs by Beginning Seniority 
 
 
1.5.5 Econometric Analysis 
 The following section details econometric analysis using individual voter and legislator 
choices. Table 3 shows results from pooled logit analysis using the data on voter choices. The 
dependent variable is the probability of  voting for the incumbent. Period and session fixed effects 
are included and standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The session fixed effects served 
to control whether the voters in the session were pro-choice or pro-life as well as the order of  the 
treatments. Treatment 1 and 2 data are pooled for this regression. The sample includes only those 
voters who did not always vote for or against the incumbent, hence the seemingly strange number 
of  observations. Figure 10 shows the distribution of  voters by incumbent vote for both Treatment 1 
and Treatment 2. The horizontal axes measure proportion of  votes for the incumbent by voter, and 
the vertical axes indicate the proportion of  the sample in each bin. Results show that 32% of  voters 
in Treatment 1 always voted for the incumbent and 19% of  voters in Treatment 2 did likewise. The 
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shapes of  the distributions are telling as the Treatment 2 distribution is far less skewed to the right 
indicating more voters choosing the challenger.   
  
 
Table 3: Probability of Voting for Incumbent Pooled Logit Regression 
 
Independent Variables 
Marginal Effects and 
Standard Errors 
Junior * Vote Against District Majority (VADM) 
-0.18* 
(0.09) 
Senior * Vote With District Majority (VWDM) 
0.22*** 
(0.06) 
Junior * VWDM 
0.21*** 
(0.06) 
Term Limits (TL) * Senior * VADM 
-0.31** 
(0.13) 
TL * Junior * VADM 
-0.35*** 
(0.08) 
TL * Senior * VWDM 
0.32*** 
(0.04) 
TL * Junior * VWDM 
0.01 
(0.06) 
Tax Vote 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
Strength of Preference 
-0.06** 
(0.03) 
Observations 1010 
Likelihood Ratio -581.16 
PCP 0.68 
Standard errors clustered at individual levels. (*),(**) and (***) indicate pvalue < 
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Period fixed effects also included in the regres-
sion. 
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Figure 10: Distributions of  Voters by Proportion of  Votes for the Incumbent 
 
   
 The main goal in analyzing the individual voter decision is to verify that the individual 
response matches what the aggregate results are suggesting. The reference group contains voters 
with senior incumbents who shirk when term limits are not in place. We can see that voters were 
significantly less likely on average to vote for a shirking junior incumbent than a senior one implying 
once again that voters responded to the seniority structure in the legislature. Voters were also 
significantly more likely to vote for both senior and junior incumbents that did not shirk than a 
shirking senior incumbent when terms were not limited. In fact, they were approximately twenty-
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
P
e
rc
e
n
t
Individual proportion of votes for the incumbent
Treatment 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
P
e
rc
e
n
t
Individual proportion of votes for the incumbent
Treatment 2
32 
 
percent more likely. This is interesting since it did not show up in the reelection rates, which implies 
that although the average voter responded to shirking the pivotal voter in most districts did not 
choose to hold the legislator accountable for shirking. Referring to Figure 7, there is only a small 
difference in Treatment 1 reelection rates between senior incumbents who shirk and those who do 
not; however, the positive and significant coefficient on Senior*VWDM indicates that an individual 
was more likely to vote for a senior incumbent who does not shirk than one who does. 
 The main variable of  interest is TL * Senior * VADM, or senior incumbents who shirk under 
term limits. Theory suggests that voters who value policy representation should be less likely to vote 
for a shirking senior incumbent under term limits. A vote was not taken in a district whose 
incumbent is actually term limited, so the variables indicating Treatment 2 signify incumbents who 
are in the first term of  the two period term limit. Results show that a voter was significantly less 
likely to vote for senior and junior incumbents who voted against the majority under term limits 
than a shirking senior incumbent when terms were not limited. Under term limits, a voter was thirty 
percent less likely to vote for a shirking senior incumbent than when terms were not limited. A voter 
was roughly thirty-five percent likely to vote for a shirking junior incumbent when terms were 
limited than a shirking senior incumbent when terms were not limited. Therefore, the behavior at 
the individual level is consistent with theory and suggests that the average voter perceived that term 
limits reduced the cost of  firing a senior incumbent. Recall though that the aggregate reelection rates 
of  senior incumbents who voted against the district majority were not different between treatments. 
 Overall, it appears that the average voter responded to shirking, whether senior or junior, but 
they did so to a greater extent when the incumbent was junior and the cost of  doing so was low. 
These results highlight the importance of  group choice and aggregating individual decisions. They 
are also consistent with other findings that suggest voters respond to  roll-call votes that align with 
extreme party positions, but it does not impact reelection rates (Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan 
2002).  
 Finally, one of  the important predictors of  voting against the incumbent is a voter‟s strength 
of  preference. These data come from the pre-experiment survey. The values range from 1 to 3. By 
this measure, a stronger policy preference means a voter is more likely to vote against a shirking 
incumbent. According to the results, a voter who strongly identified with the interest group and 
whose legislator was senior and shirked was twelve percent less likely to vote for reelection than a 
voter who only somewhat identified with the interest group all else constant. 
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Experiment Result 5: Regression results indicate that when terms are not limited an individual was significantly less 
likely to vote for a shirking senior incumbent than senior or junior incumbents who vote with the district majority. They 
were also significantly less likely to vote for a shirking senior incumbent when terms were limited than when they were 
not; suggesting voters recognized the reduced cost of  replacing an incumbent when seniority is capped. The insignificant 
difference between reelection rates of  shirking senior incumbents between treatments underscores the importance of  
aggregating choices and suggests that the average voter was influenced by shirking behavior but the pivotal voter was 
not. Stronger policy preferences also predict an inclination to vote against an incumbent who shirks. 
  
 
Table 4: Probability of Voting Against District Majority Pooled Logit Regression 
 
Independent Variables Marginal Effects and Standard Errors 
Senior 
0.24*** 
(0.09) 
Term Limit (TL) * Senior 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
TL *Junior 
0.12 
(0.10) 
Last Term 
0.28 
(0.19) 
Strength of Preference (SOP) 
0.21** 
(0.05) 
Last Term * SOP 
-0.09 
(0.07) 
Number of Observations 470 
Likelihood Ratio  -231.81 
PCP 0.24 
Standard errors clustered at the individual level. (*), (**), and (***)  indicate pva-
lues < 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 respectively. Period fixed effects also included in the 
regression. Limited indicates an incumbent that is in their last term.  
 
  
 The incumbents‟ decisions to shirk were analyzed and results are displayed in Table 4. The 
dependent variable is the likelihood of  voting against the district majority. The sample only includes 
legislators whose policy preference differed from the majority in their district. Period and session 
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fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Senior incumbents 
are significantly more likely to vote against the district majority, which again suggests that subjects 
did understand that the seniority advantage insulates incumbents from losing reelection even though 
the rate of  voting against the district majority was lower than expected.   
 One concern about term limits is the disincentive for incumbents to exert high effort in a 
repeated game with a finite ending. Incumbents have the incentive to shirk, especially in their last 
terms in office. Last Term is equal to one for legislators in their last term of  the two period term 
limit. This variable is also interacted with an incumbent‟s strength of  preference. The insignificant 
effects of  these variables indicate that there was not significantly more shirking by these incumbents. 
This reinforces the difference-of-means test suggesting the unraveling predicted using backward 
induction does not occur.  
 Finally, the likelihood of  shirking increased with the incumbents‟ strength of  preference. An 
incumbent that strongly identified with their interest group was forty-two percent more likely to 
shirk than one who only somewhat identified their interest group. 
 
Experiment Result 6: Seniority and strength of  preference are significant predictors of  an incumbent’s vote against the 
district majority. Incumbents in their last term were no more likely to shirk under term limits ceteris peribus.  
 
5.6 Supplementary Results 
 Subjects‟ strength of  preference did not significantly differ from session to session, but this 
possibility was controlled for in the regression analysis. Pro-life subjects had an average strength of  
1.83 whereas self-identified pro-choice subjects had an average strength of  1.98 (tstat 1.03 pvalue 
0.30). Thus the average subject was at the midpoint of  identifying themselves as either pro-choice or 
pro-life. 
 Remember that in a session all of  the voters supported the same side of  the issue. Overall, 
the charity that the voters did not prefer received the donation twenty-one percent of  the time.  In 
sessions 1,2,4,5 and 6 where voters were self-identified pro-choice, the pro-life policy passed fifteen 
times every 100 periods. In the third, seventh and eighth sessions with pro-life voters, the pro-choice 
policy passed thirty two times every 100 periods, which is a significant difference (tstat 2.52 pvalue 
0.01). There was no difference between treatments. It is also important to note that controls for the 
policy outcome in the regressions was never significant and did not change the other results. Thus, 
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voters cared about the incumbents‟ choices but not significantly about the actual outcome of  the 
policy vote.  
 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
  
 This project tests the theory that a system that favors seniority encourages voters to compete 
for transfers via the legislature and disregard policy. It employs a novel use of  visceral and monetary 
incentives in the lab where payoffs are affected by seniority advantage but overall utility is affected 
by the policy choices of  legislators. These policy choices are made by voting to donate money to 
either one of  two foundations that stand on opposing sides of  the abortion issue. Work by Zajonc 
(1980) and Lowenstein (1996) suggests that visceral responses are greater than those seen involving 
monetary payoffs, contrary to mainstream thought in economics and political science, but that does 
not seem to be the case here. 
 It was proposed that the advantage of  seniority and competition for pork would lead voters 
to disregard policy choice and to reelect incumbents because of  monetary incentives. This would 
then lead to poor policy representation by legislators as well as disparity in the balance of  tax 
benefits and costs. Term limits were proposed as a way to reduce seniority advantage and reduce the 
cost of  replacing an incumbent, encouraging voters to give weight to policy choices and replace 
legislators who vote against the district majority. They were also anticipated to improve the disparity 
in voter payoffs. 
 Results are not quite as expected. First, the tax does not always pass even with an artificial 
minimum winning majority. Senior legislators essentially give up monetary benefits to their voters. 
One might expect legislators with opposing policy preferences to at least pass the tax to buy off  
voters on the policy issue, much like the model by Jackson and Moselle (2002). The obvious 
possibility is that subjects exhibited other-regarding preferences. 
 Second, and more importantly, term limits do not decrease the likelihood of  reelection for 
senior incumbents after voting against the majority. Although incumbents vote against district 
majorities far less than predicted, voters respond to the seniority structure by almost always 
reelecting senior incumbents even when they vote against the district majority while reelecting 
shirking junior incumbents much less frequently. Nevertheless, shirking senior incumbents are 
reelected significantly less often than those who vote with the district majority. Thus, voters appear 
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to compete for monetary payoffs and respond to policy representation when the cost of  doing so is 
low. On the other hand, results at the individual level are in line with theory as the typical voter was 
significantly less likely to vote for shirking senior incumbent when terms were limited than when 
they were not. The discrepancy between district level results and those at the individual level are 
attributed to the problem of  aggregation of  preferences. Although voters responded to shirking on 
average, the pivotal voters was not moved enough to affect reelection rates to a very large degree. 
 Finally, it is likely that term limits significantly reduced the distribution effects on voter 
payoffs. Distribution of  voter payoffs is highly skewed in the control treatment when the tax passed 
roughly every period, but there is no statistically significant difference between the distributions of  
Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 because the voters in Treatment 1 were not always taxed. 
 The model and experimental design are stylized, but I argue that the incentives point in the 
right directions. Results could impact policy by changing the institutions within legislatures. Term 
limits were tested here, but other mechanisms may be discovered after a general review of  the 
seniority system. The mission of  legislators in Congress might be re-examined if  voters see them as 
providers of  transfers rather than law makers. This may translate into a new institutional structure 
with term limits or some other change where leadership and committee seats are no longer 
determined by tenure but some other mechanism. 
 One important benefit of  this experimental design is that it lends itself  well to extensions 
that address other important topics in political economy as well as behavioral sciences. Right away it 
is apparent that according to the model used, smaller and poorer districts should be even more likely 
to reelect incumbents in order to secure more pork. Treatments using districts of  different sizes and 
districts with varying endowments could easily address this concept. Another concern with seniority 
advantage is that voters disregard legislators‟ abuse of  perquisites because of  the competition for 
pork. A similar design can be easily implemented that allows the legislators to allocate a share of  the 
transfer to themselves. The question is whether voters will overlook this knowing the district‟s share 
of  pork is dependent upon seniority. This particular project is currently underway. 
 Opponents of  term limits claim that an unintended consequence to capping tenure is that 
qualified challengers will postpone running for office until the incumbent is forced to leave in effort 
to more effectively use campaign funds. This of  course excludes political capital building campaigns. 
Creating a cost for inactive legislators wanting to be considered to replace incumbents would 
simulate this idea. Framing it in opportunity cost terms and awarding bonuses to those inactive 
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legislators who withdraw their names from consideration could be a way of  doing this. The 
laboratory has been, and will continue to be, an important research tool in answering challenging 
questions in political economy. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
A.1 Sample of  Instructions 
Thank you for coming on time and participating in today‟s experiment. This is an experiment on 
decision-making and you will have the opportunity to earn money according to the choices you 
make. You are free to withdraw from the experiment without additional compensation and without 
incurring the ill will of  the experimenters at any time. If  you do so, you may keep the$10 show-up 
fee. Please do not talk during the experiment and do not use any device such as a cell phone, mp3 
player or texting device. If  you have a question, please raise your hand and I will be by to answer 
your question privately. 
 
ROUND ONE 
You have completed a short survey that included questions involving your preferences regarding 
certain political issues. While your responses will not directly affect your payoff, they will be used in 
today‟s experiment. 
The experiment consists of  three rounds. The first round will last five periods. The second 
and third rounds will last ten periods each.  
In today's experiment, each of  you will be assigned roles. You have been randomly selected 
to be either a Type A player or a Type B player. There will be five groups of  players in the 
experiment, and each group will have three Type A players and one Type B player. There are a total 
of  15 Type A players and 10 Type B players in the experiment. This means that at any point in time, 
half  of  the Type B players will be in a group and half  of  them will not. You will be informed of  
your role shortly, but first we will discuss the differences between types and how the groups work.  
Type A players receive an endowment of  45 cents each period, which they will either keep or 
contribute to a public account that will be divided among the groups. Each period the Type B 
players from each group vote to decide how the Type A players will use their endowments. The 
outcome is determined by a simple majority rule. That is, if  at least three Type B players vote for 
keeping the endowment, the Type A players keep their endowments that period. If  at least three 
Type B players vote for contributing to the public account, the Type A players will contribute their 
endowments to the public account and may receive a portion of  the overall sum. Type A players will 
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see the outcome of  the vote as well as the vote cast by the Type B player from their group. This will 
happen every period.  
Type B players are either Active or Inactive. Whether a Type B player is Active or Inactive 
can change from period to period. Active Type B players belong to groups, vote and receive a salary 
of  60 cents each period for their participation in their groups. Inactive Type B players do not belong 
to any group, do not vote and do not earn a salary. They are waiting for the opportunity to replace 
an Active Type B player. While they are waiting they will have a chance to earn some money in 
another activity decoding words for 2.5 cents for every correct code. I will explain how that works 
shortly. 
After Active Type B players vote to determine how Type A players will use their 
endowments, the Type A players will see the outcome and vote within their group whether to keep 
the Type B player for the next period or replace them. If  at least two Type A players from the group 
vote to keep the Type B player, he or she will stay for at least one more period. If  at least two of  the 
Type A players vote to replace the Type B player, that Active Type B player becomes Inactive and is 
replaced by a randomly chosen Inactive Type B player. Type A players will vote every period. 
The table below summarizes the different roles and group make up. 
 
Role Number in each 
Group 
Activity Pay 
Type A 3 Vote on Type B players 
Keep 45 cents or Split 
the Public Account 
Active Type B 1 
Vote on Type A 
endowments 
60 cents 
Inactive Type B 0 Decode text strings 
2.5 cents for every 
correct code 
 
 
Now I will explain how the public account is split up. The amount a group receives from the 
public account is based on the tenure rank of  its Type B player. That is, the Active Type B players 
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will be ranked based on the number of  consecutive periods they have been Active and this 
determines the amount their group gets from the public account. The Active Type B player that is 
ranked first has the highest number of  consecutive periods as an Active Type B player, the second 
ranked has the second highest number of  consecutive periods as an Active Type B player, and so on.  
Tenure rank can change based on the groups‟ decisions to keep or replace their Active Type 
B players. For example, if  you are in a group whose Active Type B player is ranked 3rd, he or she 
has the third highest amount of  consecutive periods of  activity. If  the 2nd ranked Active Type B 
player is replaced, then all the Active Type B players ranked lower than 2nd will move up in the 
ranking. That is, the 3rd ranking Active Type B player will become the 2nd ranked Active Type B 
player, the 4th ranking Active Type B player will become the 3rd ranked, and so on. The Active Type 
B player ranked first will not be affected.  If  an Inactive Type B player becomes Active, they will 
begin at the bottom of  the ranking. If  more than one Type B player is activated at the same time, 
and thus have the same tenure, their ranks will be determined randomly. 
The Type A players will know the ranks of  each group‟s Active Type B player. This will be 
indicated on the screen next to “Group X Rank: #”. The Active Type B players will know their own 
rank.  
The three groups whose Active Type B players are ranked 1st, 2nd, and 3rd will receive 1/3 of  
the public account. This 1/3 will then be divided evenly among all the Type A players within those 
groups. The two groups whose current Type B players are ranked 4th and 5th will contribute to the 
public account, but will not receive a share when it is split up. To begin each round, the tenure rank 
will be randomly assigned to the Active Type B players. Thereafter, the tenure rank is determined by 
the number of  periods as an Active Type B player.  
If  the Type A players keep their endowments, the public account contains nothing. If  each 
Type A player contributes their 45 cents to the public account, there is 15 x 45 = 675 cents in the 
public account to be split up. (There are a total of  15 Type A players and each has 45 cents.) If  your 
group receives 1/3 of  the public account, it will receive 225 cents (675 x 1/3) to split among the 
Type A players, or 75 cents for each Type A player (225 x 1/3). When voting to determine how the 
Type A players will use their endowments, the Active Type B players as well as the Type A players 
will know how much their group will receive if  the endowments are put into the public account. 
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To begin, the first round of  five periods will function as I have explained. Half  of  the Type 
B players are Active and half  are Inactive. The rank of  Active Type B players has been randomly 
determined to begin the round.  
The next screen will show you your role. If  you are a Type A player you will also see your 
group number for this round. Remember you will be a Type A player for the entire experiment, but 
you will be in a new group each round. If  you are a Type B player you will see whether you are 
Active or Inactive. Remember, you will be a Type B player for the entire experiment. When voting 
begins, the top of  the screen will remind you of  the Round and Period numbers and your role. If  
you are a Type A player you will see your Group number and your earnings for the entire 
experiment. If  you are a Type B player you will see whether you are active or inactive, your tenure 
rank if  you are active and your earnings for the entire experiment. 
 
Decoding 
I will quickly explain what the Inactive Type B players are doing while the others are voting. If  you 
are Inactive you will see a screen like the one shown at the front of  the room. You will be decoding 
lines of  text and can earn 2.5 cents for every line of  text you decode correctly. Notice the first box 
contains instructions and the second box contains the decoding key. You will use this to find the 
numbers that correspond to the letters given to you as shown. You will enter each number and hit 
“OK”. Notice the box in the lower left corner keeps track of  the number of  correct and incorrect 
codes, along with your earnings from decoding. These earnings will be added to any earnings you 
receive while playing as an Active Type B player. There is no limit on how many codes you can be 
paid for, but your time is limited by the amount of  time it takes for the Active Type B players and 
Type A players to vote. After the Active Type B players vote there will be a short pause informing 
you that the Type B players have voted and where you will see your current status. After that you will 
continue decoding while the Type A players make their decisions. 
If  there are no questions we will begin the first round of  the experiment. Please click the 
OK button at the bottom of  your screen. 
 
ROUND TWO 
Type A players will now be assigned a new group and will remain in this group for the entire round. 
Your role as either a Type A or Type B player is the same as the previous round. Half  of  the Type B 
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players begin the round Active and half  begin Inactive. The group and rank of  Active Type B 
players have been randomly determined to begin the round. 
This round will last ten periods and will function similarly to the first round, but a new 
dimension has been added to the choice of  the Type B players. Each period there is a sum of  money 
to be donated to one of  two foundations. Not only will the Active Type B players vote to determine 
how the Type A players use their endowments, they also vote to determine which foundation 
receives the donation. Remember that this sum of  money does NOT affect your payoffs at the end 
of  the experiment.  
Each period there are 200 cents available to donate to one of  two foundations. Those 
foundations are Pro-Choice America and the Pro-Life Action League. You have been given a 
description of  each foundation. If  at least three Active Type B players vote for Pro-Choice America, 
then the 200 cents will be added to a pot of  money that will be sent to that foundation at the end of  
the experiment. If  at least three Active Type B players vote for the Pro-Life Action League, the 200 
cents will go to that foundation at the end of  the experiment. Type A players will see the outcome 
of  the vote as well as the vote cast by their group‟s Type B player. 
Active Type B players first vote on how Type A players will use their endowments, and then 
vote on the donation. Before the vote the Type A players and Active Type B players will be shown 
the foundation that the majority of  Type A players in their group prefer. These preferences were 
taken from the surveys you completed prior to participating in the experiment. Remember, the 
foundation you prefer does not affect your payoffs, nor does the donation. After the Type B players 
vote on both issues, the Type A players will see the outcomes of  both votes and then vote on the 
group‟s Active Type B player just as you saw in Round One. The voting rules are the same in this 
round. 
Remember, the groups and the rankings of  the Active Type B players have been randomly 
determined to begin the round. The public account is divided in the same way as the previous 
round. If  there are no further questions, we will begin the second round. 
 
ROUND THREE 
Type A players will now be assigned a new group and will remain in this group for the entire round. 
Your role as either a Type A or Type B player is the same as in the previous round. Half  of  the Type 
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B players will begin the round as Active and half  will begin as Inactive. The group and rank of  
Active Type B players have been randomly determined to begin the round. 
This round will last ten periods and will function similarly to the second round. Each period, 
Type B players vote to determine the use of  Type A player„s endowments as well as vote to decide 
how the donation will be allocated.  
In this round Type B players will be limited in how many consecutive periods they can be 
Active for a particular group. That limit is 2 consecutive periods. When an Active Type B player 
reaches the 2 period limit, they automatically become Inactive and are replaced by a randomly 
chosen Inactive Type B player. The Type A players of  that group are informed that the Type B 
player has reached the limit and they will not vote.  
To begin the round, the three highest ranking Active Type B players face the limit after two 
periods if  they are not voted Inactive by their group members prior to the second period. The other 
Active Type B players ranked 4th and 5th will then move up in rank and will face the 2 period limit in 
the 3rd period if  they are not voted Inactive by their group prior to the third period. If  any Active 
Type B player is voted Inactive in any period, the incoming Type B player faces the 2 period limit 
two periods after becoming Active regardless of  their group or rank if  they are not replaced before 
reaching the limit. 
To be clear, the groups that begin the round with Active Type B players ranked 1st, 2nd and 
3rd will face the two period limit in the second period of  the round unless they vote to replace the 
Active Type B player before reaching the second period. The groups that begin the round with 
Active Type B players ranked 4th and 5th will face the two period limit in the third period of  the 
round unless they vote to replace the Active Type B player before reaching the third period.  
Remember, the groups and the rankings of  the Active Type B players have been randomly 
determined to begin the round. The public account is divided in the same way as the previous 
rounds. The donation is determined the same way as before. If  there are no further questions, we 
will begin the third round. 
 
A.2 Sample of  Foundation Descriptions 
The Pro-Life Action League was founded by in 1980 with the aim of  saving unborn children 
through non-violent direct action. Members spread their message through non-violent protests, 
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confronting abortionists, sidewalk counseling outside of  abortion clinics and youth outreach 
programs. 
For 40 years, NARAL Pro-Choice America has been the nation's leading advocate for 
privacy and a woman's right to choose. The organization works to elect Pro-Choice candidates and 
lobbies Congress to support Pro-Choice legislation. 
A.3 Pre-experiment Survey 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this survey. The following questions relate to current 
political issues. Completing this survey will allow you the chance to participate in a future study at 
XSFS, but you are not obligated to do so. Your answers are confidential and secured and will not be 
distributed to any other party for any other purpose. You are not required to answer any of the 
questions, but you are encouraged to answer as accurately as possible. 
  Participation in the survey is purely voluntary and does not affect your eligibility to partici-
pate in other XSFS studies. If you choose, you can leave the survey at any time and doing so will not 
prevent you from participating in other experiments. 
1. The Pro-Life Action League was founded by in 1980 with the aim of  saving unborn children 
through non-violent direct action. Members spread their message through non-violent 
protests, confronting abortionists, sidewalk counseling outside of  abortion clinics and youth 
outreach programs. 
How well do you identify with the Pro-Life Action League? 
 
 Strongly Do Not Identify 
 Do Not Identify 
 Somewhat Do Not Identify 
 Neutral 
 Somewhat Identify 
 Identify 
 Strongly Identify 
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2. For 40 years, NARAL Pro-Choice America has been the nation's leading advocate for 
privacy and a woman's right to choose. The organization works to elect Pro-Choice 
candidates and lobbies Congress to support Pro-Choice legislation. 
How well do you identify with NARAL Pro-Choice America? 
 
 Strongly Do Not Identify 
 Do Not Identify 
 Somewhat Do Not Identify 
 Neutral 
 Somewhat Identify 
 Identify 
 Strongly Identify 
 
3. As America's oldest civil rights organization, the Nation Rifle Association's (NRA) mission is 
to preserve and defend the U.S. Constitution, especially the inalienable right to keep and 
bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment. 
  When restrictive “gun control” legislation is proposed at the local, state or federal 
level, NRA members and supporters are alerted and respond with individual letters, faxes, e-
mails and calls to their elected representatives to make their views known. 
How well do you identify with the NRA? 
 Strongly Do Not Identify 
 Do Not Identify 
 Somewhat Do Not Identify 
 Neutral 
 Somewhat Identify 
 Identify 
 Strongly Identify 
 
4. The Coalition to Stop Gun Violence (CSGV) seeks to secure freedom from gun violence 
through research, strategic engagement and effective policy advocacy. 
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CSGV is comprised of 48 national organizations working to reduce gun violence including 
religious organizations, child welfare advocates, public health professionals, and social justice 
organizations.  
How well do you identify with CSGV? 
 Strongly Do Not Identify 
 Do Not Identify 
 Somewhat Do Not Identify 
 Neutral 
 Somewhat Identify 
 Identify 
 Strongly Identify 
 
5. Friends of the Earth are the world's largest grassroots environmental network and cam-
paigns on today's most urgent environmental and social issues. It challenges the current 
model of economic and corporate globalization, and promotes solutions that will help to 
create environmentally sustainable and socially just societies.  
How well do you identify with the Friends of the Earth? 
 Strongly Do Not Identify 
 Do Not Identify 
 Somewhat Do Not Identify 
 Neutral 
 Somewhat Identify 
 Identify 
 Strongly Identify 
 
6. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself  to be a(n): 
Democrat 
Independent 
Republican 
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Libertarian 
Socialist 
Other (please specify) _________ 
Don‟t Know 
 
7. Would you describe yourself  as religious?  Yes  No 
 
8. What, if  any, is your religious preference? 
Protestant 
Catholic 
LDS / Mormon 
Jewish 
Muslim 
Other  (specify) __________ 
No Preference / No religious affiliation 
Prefer not to say 
 
9. What is your age?      _______ 
 
10. Are you male or female?   ________ 
 
11. Are you? 
 Single  Married Divorced Remarried Committed 
 
12. Are you a parent? Yes   No 
 
13. What is your major? _____________ 
 
14. Which of  the following best describes you? 
American Indian/ Native American 
Caucasian/ White 
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African American/ Black 
Hispanic / Latino 
Asian 
Pacific Islander 
Other  _________ 
 
15. What is your home state, district or territory? ________ 
16. How much of  the time do you think you can trust government in Washington to do what is 
right? 
Just about always Most of  the time Only some of  the time  Never 
17. Do you consider yourself  politically active? Yes No 
18. Did you vote in the last presidential election? Yes No 
19. Did you vote in the last congressional election? Yes No 
20. Did you vote in the last state elections?   Yes No 
21. If you would like to participate in a study related to this survey, please provide your name 
and the email address you use to receive emails from XSFS so that you can be invited to par-
ticipate. ___________________ _______________ 
Thank you for completing the survey. Because of  your participation, you are now eligible to partici-
pate in an upcoming experiment related to this survey. 
  The experiment connected to this survey will begin running in the near future and invita-
tions for participating in it will be sent at that time.  
 
